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INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff Abraham & Associates Trust (Michael Robert Barker, Trustee) submits 
the following closing brief in connection with its appeal of the trial court's Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law entered March 8, 2010 in this proceeding; the Entry of 
Judgment dated April 21, 2010 herein; and the trial court's denial of Plaintiff s Motion 
for a New Trial on jurisdictional grounds dated January 1, 2011 herein. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: NEITHER PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW 
TRIAL OR PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF APPEAL 
FROM THE DENIAL THEREOF WAS UNTIMELY. 
While Defendants/Appellees never raised any question of timeliness in connection 
with either Plaintiff/Appellant's motion for a new trial before the trial court or its notices 
of appeal to this Court, Defendants/Appellees' brief now seeks to defend the trial court's 
dismissal of Plaintiff/Appellant's motion as untimely, and to label this appeal likewise 
untimely. Defendants/Appellees' position (like that of the trial court) is apparently that: 
(1) judgment was entered April 21, 2010; (2) Plaintiff/Appellant's motion for a new trial 
was not "filed" until May 5, 2010, the date stamped on the file copy by the trial court; 
(3) Rule 6(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure apparently does not apply (although no 
reason for this position is stated); (4) Plaintiff/Appellant's motion for a new trial 
therefore had to be filed not later than Monday, May 3, 2010, but was supposedly not; 
(5) the trial court therefore had "discretion" to deny the motion for a new trial as having 
been filed two days late; and (6) since Plaintiff/Appellant's motion for a new trial was 
QRM10 1 
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untimely, Plaintiff/Appellant's appeal time ran from April 21, 2010 - not January 1, 
2011, the date on which the Court denied its motion for a new trial (R 739-741). 
It is submitted that case law concerning the timeliness of Plaintiff/Appellant's 
motion for a new trial is sufficiently abundant, and sufficiently clear, that 
Defendants/Appellees' argument in this regard borders on bad faith. 
A. Denial of a Motion for a New Trial on Jurisdictional Grounds Is a Question of 
Law, Reviewed for Correctness - Not a Matter to Be Reviewed Only for an 
Abuse of Discretion, 
Defendants/Appellees cite the Court to numerous decisions holding that, in 
general, the trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial under Rule 59 must not be 
overturned absent "a manifest abuse of discretion" (Opposing Brief at p. 19). Where a 
trial court denies a motion for a new trial on its merits, this is certainly the case - a trial 
court is clothed with broad discretion to grant or deny such a motion. See Green v. 
Louder, 2001 UT 62, 29 P.3d 638. 
In this case, however, the trial court did not reach the merits of Plaintiff/ 
Appellant's motion at all. Instead, nearly eight months after the motion was filed, the 
trial court issued a two-page order in which it expressly declined to reach any of the 
merits of the motion, holding instead that, as a matter of law, it had been filed beyond the 
ten-day jurisdictional time limit, and therefore was barred. Where a court declines 
jurisdiction, the decision presents a question of law reviewed for correctness, and the trial 
court is afforded no discretion - see Brewster v. Brewster, 241 P.3d 357, 2010 UT App 
2 
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260; Capital One Bank N.A. v. Withers, P. 3d , 2009 WL 3042393, 2009 UT App 
275. 
B. Governing Utah Case Law Conclusively Establishes That 
Plaintiff/Appellant's Motion for a New Trial Was Timely Filed. 
Like the trial court, Defendants/Appellees conclude - without explanation or 
examination - that Plaintiff/Appellant's motion for a new trial was not filed until May 5, 
2010, as this was the date on which the motion was date-stamped by the clerk of the court 
in Kane County, Utah. There is no suggestion, though, that the certificate of service on 
either Plaintiff/Appellant's motion for a new trial (R 651) or its memorandum of law in 
support thereof (R 699) were fabricated or inaccurate. And both certificates established 
that Plaintiff/Appellant's motion for a new trial, and the supporting memorandum, were 
served via first-class mail and telefax on opposing counsel on May 3, 2010 - the exact 
date which, by Defendants/Appellees' own admission, would unquestionably be timely 
(Appellees'Brief at p. 19). 
As noted in Plaintiff/Appellant's opening brief, "service by mail, email or fax is 
complete upon sending" - Rule 5(b) (1) (B), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 5(d), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, then states that "all papers after the complaint required to 
be served upon a party shall be filed with the Court either before or within a reasonable 
time after service" (emphasis added). On two separate occasions, the Utah Appellate 
Courts have held that a motion for a new trial served on opposing counsel within ten 
days, and filed with the clerk of the court within two days thereafter, are timely under the 
foregoing rules. 
3 
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In the case of Dehm v. Dehrn, 545 P.2d 525 (Utah 1976), the former husband in a 
divorce proceeding appealed the trial court's refusal to reduce or eliminate alimony, 
having been unsuccessful in a motion for a new trial before the lower court. The former 
wife argued that, because the motion for a new trial had been filed with the trial court 12 
days after the entry of judgment, it should be deemed untimely under Rule 59, even 
though service on opposing counsel had been accomplished two days before. The 
Supreme Court rejected the argument, noting the following: 
Defendant's contention is that a motion for a new trial must not only be 
served, but filed, not later than ten days after the entry of judgment. 
Rule 5(d), URCP, provides: 
All papers after the complaint required to be served upon a 
party shall be filed with the court either before service or 
within a reasonable time thereafter. 
The motion was filed within two days after service which comports with 
the reasonable time requirement of Rule 5(d), URCP. 
545 P.2d at 529. 
More recently, in the case of Putvin v. Thompson, 878 P.2d 1178 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994), a similar challenge was issued against a motion for a new trial as having been filed 
with the Court more than ten days after the entry of judgment. The Court of Appeals held 
the filing timely, observing the following: 
The Rule 59 motion may have been served prior to filing and within the 
ten-day period required by Rule 59. If so, filing the motion with the court 
some two days later is a reasonable time within the meaning of Rule 5(d), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
878P.2datl l81. 
A 
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Prior Utah decisions, in short, are unanimous in holding that if a motion for a new 
trial is served on opposing counsel not later than ten days following the entry of 
judgment, it is timely, provided it is filed with the trial court within a reasonable time 
thereafter. The tenth day following the trial court's denial of Plaintiff/Appellant's motion 
for a new trial herein fell on Saturday, May 1, 2010; accordingly, the deadline was 
extended to Monday, May 3, 2010 pursuant to Rule 6(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
C. Even if May 5, 2010 Is Used as the Date of "Filing," Plaintiff/Appellant Was 
Timely Under Rule 6(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Defendant/Appellant has offered no argument whatever to rebut Plaintiff/ 
Appellant's claim that, under Rule 6(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the filing of its 
motion for a new trial would have been timely even had it not occurred until May 5, 
2010, given the exclusion of Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays in the computation of 
time pursuant to Rule 6(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The case of Low v. City of 
Monticello, 2002 Utah 90, 54 P.3d 1153, conclusively established that Rule 6(a) applied 
to ten-day jurisdictional deadlines for filing. As such, the question whether the date of 
service on opposing counsel, or the date of filing with the district court, governs is 
rendered moot. 
POINT II: PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT DID NOT FAIL TO 
MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE. 
I 
At pages 21-22 of their brief, Defendants/Appellees claim that Plaintiff/ 
Appellant's opening brief is "woefully deficient with respect to its obligation to marshal 
the evidence," and that Plaintiff/Appellant has "entirely failed to meets its burden to ( 
5 
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marshal the evidence." Other than making these bald statements, however, 
Defendants/Appellees offer no explanation whatever as to why Plaintiff/Appellant's brief 
is deficient in this regard, other than to observe that the separate section of 
Plaintiff/Appellant's brief entitled "Marshaling of Evidence" has fewer numbered 
paragraphs than does Plaintiff/Appellant's Statement of Facts. 
This was a one-day bench trial, with relatively simple evidence set before the 
Court. In its March 8, 2010 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R 627-639), the 
trial court itself set out in some detail the evidence upon which it relied in ruling as it did. 
These were all properly reflected in the Statement of Facts set out at pages 10-20 of 
Plaintiff/Appellant's brief. 
Indeed, it is notable that the Statement of Facts set out in Defendants/Appellees' 
brief (pp. 9-16) recites Plaintiff/Appellant's Statement of Facts verbatim, adding only 
paragraphs 3,4, 10, 17 and 26 thereto. With two exceptions, these additional paragraphs 
are not statements of evidence at all, but commentary, conclusions and argument based 
upon facts contained in Plaintiff/Appellant's brief. Defendants/Appellees' commentary 
and argument, in this regard, were claims not relied upon or stated by the trial court at all, 
but rather an additional theory of the case presented by Defendants/Appellees on appeal 
(discussed more fully at Point III, below). 
Plaintiff/Appellant (like all appellants before this Court) is keenly aware of the 
marshaling requirements imposed by recent Utah decisions. It is submitted, however, 
that if Defendants/Appellees wish to claim that the Appellant has failed to marshal the 
fi 
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evidence, they must do more than simply quote cases and count paragraphs. Absent 
some specific reference to the record, indicating evidence supporting the trial court's 
ruling but omitted from Plaintiff/Appellant's brief, Defendants'/Appellees' "failure to 
marshal" claim must be disregarded. 
POINT III: UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THE 
ELEMENTS OF EASEMENT BY NECESSITY 
BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT. 
Defendants/Appellees offer no basis for disputing the two established elements of 
easement by necessity as articulated in the case of Tschaggeny v. Union Pacific Land 
Resources Corporation, 555 P.2d 277 (Utah 1976): (1) Unity of title, followed by 
severance; and (2) That the easement is reasonably necessary to the enjoinment of the 
dominant estate (55 P.2d at 280). Yet Defendants/Appellees argue that 
Plaintiff/Appellant established neither of the two elements of easement by necessity at 
trial. Their argument concerning unity of title was consistently rejected by the trial court, 
both on motions for summary judgment and in the Court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (R 627-639); their argument concerning reasonable necessity was 
fully dealt with in Plaintiff/Appellant's opening brief, and need be revisited only briefly 
here. 
A. Undisputed Evidence at Trial Showed Unity of Title Followed by Severance. 
While Defendants/Appellees never briefed the issue before the lower court, either 
incident to dispositive motions or as part of their trial brief {see R 71-82; R 223-229; 
R 602-612), and while the trial court held, on three separate occasions, that undisputed 
980110.1 
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evidence established that the properties at issue in this case had once been held in unity of 
title, followed by severance (R 156-163; R 400-405; R 627-639), Defendants/Appellees 
now try to seize upon the pass-through nature of an August 1964 conveyance to set up a 
technical argument and defeat the first element of easement by necessity. Defendants/ 
Appellees argue that because Bertrand and Idona Smith separately conveyed two parcels 
of land to RKR Construction Company on August 1, 1964 (see Plaintiffs Exhibits 4 and 
27), and even though RKR Construction Company then conveyed the Trust Property to 
Plaintiff/Appellant's predecessor-in-interest on the very same day (see Plaintiffs Exhibit 
5), the "relevant severance" was of RKR5 s "unity of title", not Smiths' "unity of title". 
Since Smiths were not parties to the deed between RKR and Plaintiff/Appellant's 
predecessor-in-interest (Plaintiffs Exhibit 5), claim Defendants/Appellees, the first 
requirement for easement by necessity under the Tschaggeny decision is somehow 
defeated. 
Preliminarily, Defendants/Appellees ask this Court to sustain the trial court's 
ruling on grounds which that court expressly rejected. A trial court's ruling is sustainable 
on alternate legal grounds only where express findings sustain such grounds or where 
they are apparent from the record - see Francis v. State Div. of Wildlife Resources, 2010 
UT 62, 248 P.3d 44; Richardson v. Hart, 2009 UT App 387, 223 P.3d 484. As more 
fully explored below, the record does not support, on its face, any inference that any 
actual "unity of title" in the Trust Property and the RKR North property was either 
created or intended on August 1, 1964 - the clear evidence, in fact, is to the contrary. 
8 
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There is no question that, at one time, the Trust Property and the Park property 
were held in unity of title by Bertrand and Idona Smith - see Defendants'/Appellees' 
brief at Statement of Facts, p. 10, f 2. It is likewise undisputed that, on August 1, 1964, 
Smiths conveyed away title to a parcel of property which included the Trust Property 
while retaining the Park Property, thereby severing unity of title (Plaintiffs Exhibit 4; 
Defendants/Appellee's brief at Statement of Facts, If 2, pp. 10-11). Defendants/Appellees 
rely, though, on a separate conveyance, by Smiths to RKR Construction Company, of 
property to the north of the Trust Property, as a means to claim that, in fact, RKR 
Construction thereafter held the Trust Property and the north property momentarily in 
"unity of title"; since the RKR north property had access to the public road, reason 
Defendants/Appellees, no "necessity" arose out of the severance of Smiths' title per se. 
The argument ignores two crucial facts. 
First, RKR Construction did not hold the RKR north property and the Trust 
Property (however briefly - see below) in "unity of title". The RKR north property was 
conveyed by a separate instrument, creating a separate and distinct freehold, 
unencumbered by any access rights in the property to the south. While Utah courts have 
not addressed the issue, the consistent requirement is "unity of title" - not simply 
common ownership. Other jurisdictions have expressly held that, by definition, "unity of 
title" derives from a single conveyance which transfers a unified interest in the whole of 
the property at issue. See In re Thorpe, 251 B.R. 723, (Bankr. W.D. Mo., 2000); 
Fender son v. Fender son, 454 Pa. Super. 412, 685 A.2d 600 (Super. Ct. Pa 1996). Thus, 
980110 1 
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two separate parcels of property conveyed at separate times by separate instruments to 
the same transferee (whatever their geographic proximity) are not held in "unity of title". 
Either can be conveyed away without disturbing the unity of title held in the other. On 
August 1, 1964, Bertrand and Idona Smith severed their "unity of title" in the larger tract 
of land by conveying one parcel and retaining the other. The fact that Smiths also gave a 
separate deed (held however briefly - see below), to a separate tract of land, to the same 
transferee did not create a "unity of title" entitling the Trust Property to access adjacent 
public roads over another parcel of land where no such right of way was reserved. 
Far more compelling than the foregoing, however, is the reality of the August 1, 
1964 transaction as shown from the face of the documents before the trial court. While 
(as the trial court pointed out) Plaintiff/Appellant was unable to produce witnesses to 
speak to the intent of the Smiths in their conveyances of 45 lA years before, the trial court 
had before it two deeds to the same parcel of real property, executed on the same day: 
the deed to the parcel of land containing the Trust Property from Bertrand and Idona 
Smith to RKR Construction (Plaintiffs Exhibit 4), and the deed from RKR Construction 
to Smith, Watson and LeFevre of the same day (Plaintiffs Exhibit 5). On the face of the 
documents, it is clear that these two transactions formed part of a single, previously-
agreed transaction under which title would simply pass through RKR Construction to 
Watson, Smith and LeFevre. (Note, in this regard, that the deed to the RKR north 
property, also signed and conveyed on August 1, 1964, was actually notarized by Oliver 
LeFevre, Plaintiff/Appellant's predecessor in the Trust Property and transferee of the 
10 
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Trust Property on that same day - see Plaintiffs Exhibits 4, 5 and 27.) Clearly, then, at 
the time title to the Trust Property passed to RKR Construction, it was already under 
contract. Utah law has expressly recognized the doctrine of "equitable conversion", 
under which "the vendee of an executory land sale contract holds equitable ownership of 
the property but not legal title", and "even though the vendor may retain title to the 
property, that title is effectively held for the benefit of the vendee, to whom it will pass if 
the contract is carried out" - Haik v. Sandy City, 2011 Utah 26, P.3d , at f 21. It 
is clear from the face of the conveyances before the trial court that RKR Construction 
contemporaneously received, and transferred away, title to the Trust Property at the same 
time as part of a single transaction; any title which it may briefly have held to that 
property, therefore, was legal in nature only, subject to the equitable interest of Smith,
 ( 
Watson and LeFevre. On this basis as well, RKR Construction did not hold title to both 
properties in "unity of title", as Defendants/Appellees contend - Riffle v. Worthen, 327 
i 
Ark. 470, 939 S.W.2d 294 (Ark. 1997); Tripp v. Huff 606 A.2d 792 (Me. 1992); Garvin 
v. State, 116 Misc. 408, 190 N.Y.S. 143 (Ct. CI. 1921). 
Finally, the Court needs to step back from Defendants/Appellees' technical i 
arguments, and recognize that the doctrine of easement by necessity is an equitable 
doctrine, affording an equitable remedy for a situation where a common tract of land is 
i 
divided up by conveyances, such that a portion thereof loses access to the outside world 
(Potter v. Chadaz, 1999 Ut. App. 95, 977 P.2d 533). As the trial court clearly 
recognized, Defendants/Appellees' arguments concerning whose title was severed, and at ' 
oem in i 
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what instant in time, exalt form over substance, contrary to fundamental principles of 
equity (Karol v. Board of Education Trustees, Florence Unified School No. 1 of Pinal 
County, 122 Ariz. 95, 593 P.2d 649 (1979); Decker v. Berean, Berean Baptist Church, 
624 P.2d 1094, 51 Or. App. 191 (1981); Ontiveros Insulation Company, Inc. v. Sanchez, 
129 N.M. 200, 3 P.3d 695 (2000). 
B. Plaintiff/Appellant Established Reasonable Necessity of an Easement by 
Undisputed Evidence. 
At pages 26-27 of their brief, Defendants/Appellees argue that Plaintiff/Appellant 
failed to establish the reasonable necessity of an easement. This question was adequately 
dealt with at pages 24-28 of Plaintiff/Appellant's opening brief. Here it may simply be 
reiterated that - by unrebutted evidence placed before the trial court - Plaintiff/Appellant 
took title to the Trust Property without any means of access to and from the adjacent 
county road that did not involve trespass over the land of a stranger. Whether such 
trespass would be simple, difficult or impossible is not the relevant question, despite the 
trial court's focus thereon. From the time it took title to the Trust Property, 
Plaintiff/Appellant could not enter its property without crossing private land belonging to 
another. It could not exit its property without doing the same. The reasonable necessity 
of easement rights across an existing right-of-way was thus established beyond question.1 
1
 Defendants/Appellees quote dicta from the 1948 decision of Savage v. Nielsen, et aL, 
114 Utah 22, 197 P.2d 117 (1948), seemingly in an attempt to argue that it was 
incumbent upon Plaintiff/Appellant to produce witnesses who could testify of physical 
necessity as of (apparently) the instant of conveyance by RKR Construction to 
Appellant's remote grantor on August 1, 1964. As noted in Plaintiff/Appellant's Opening 
Brief, the requirement stated in the Savage decision, that a servitude be "apparent, 
1? 
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POINT IV: THERE WAS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE BEFORE 
THE TRIAL COURT FROM WHICH IT COULD 
INFER INTENT BY BERTRAND AND IDONA SMITH 
TO DEFEAT AN EASEMENT BY NECESSITY TO 
AND FROM THE TRUST PROPERTY. 
The trial court's finding that Bertrand and Idona Smith expressed an intent to 
convey an easement over the RKR north property to the Trust Property was dealt with at 
pages 29-34 of Plaintiff/Appellant's opening brief. Arguments offered by Defendants/ 
Appellees do nothing to displace the fundamental facts set out therein: The "reservation" 
language contained in the August 1, 1964 deed to the RKR north property (Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 27) was legally insufficient to convey an easement to Plaintiff/Appellant's 
predecessor-in-interest in the Trust Property. It evidenced, if anything, intent to reserve 
such an easement in the Smiths themselves, but no more. Neither testimony, nor the 
language of any instrument entered into evidence, suggested that, by reserving an 
easement across the RKR north property, Smiths' intended to transfer that easement to 
the owner of the Trust Property. Were Plaintiff/Appellant to claim such an easement 
right against RKR Construction's title, it would be summarily dismissed based on 
construction of the RKR North Deed within the four corners thereof. By the same token, < 
the trial court's finding of an easement conveyance to Plaintiff/Appellant's predecessor in 
interest over the RKR north property is simply unsupported by competent evidence of 
i 
any sort. 
. _ _ ^ 
obvious and visible" at the instant of severance, was obviated by the Tschaggeny decision 
- see p. 7, above; Plaintiff/Appellant's opening brief at pp. 25-29. 
QRnun 1 
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POINT V: UNDER UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE PLACED 
BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT, THE DEEDS FROM 
IDONA SMITH TO HARRISES AND FROM 
HARRISES TO DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES, 
SHOULD BE REFORMED TO REFLECT THE 
INTENDED EXISTENCE OF AN ACCESS 
EASEMENT BETWEEN THE TRUST PROPERTY 
AND THE COUNTY ROAD. 
In answer to the argument set out at pp. 34-37 of Plaintiff/Appellant's opening 
brief, Defendants/Appellees observe only that Plaintiff/Appellant was not party to the 
transfer of the Park Property from Smiths to Paul and Gina Harris (Plaintiffs Exhibit 12), 
or from Paul and Gina Harris to the Defendants/Appellees (Plaintiffs Exhibit 13), citing 
to the case of Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota v. Mowery, 187 Ohio App. 3d 268, 931 
NE.2d 1121 (Ct. App. Ohio. 2010) for the supposed proposition that the parties seeking 
reformation of an instrument must be the named transferor or transferee thereunder. 
Mowrey, however, does not stand for any such proposition, but recognizes the principle 
that "equity will permit the reformation of a written instrument not only as between the 
original parties, but also as to parties in privity with them" - 187 Ohio App. 3d 268 at 
Tf 26 (emphasis added). As Smiths' successor-in-interest in and to the Trust Property -
which should have been benefitted by the easement had it been properly placed on the 
1964 Deed from Smiths - Plaintiff/Appellant is in privity with Smiths, and therefore, had 
standing to seek reformation. As Smiths' remote grantee to the Park Property, 
Defendants/Appellees likewise stand in privity with them. Given that Smiths' intent to 
create an easement across the Park property so clearly appears from the circumstances 
14 
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surrounding the 1964 transfers, the trial court should have inferred the intent to create 
such easement, and to preserve it through subsequent transfers of the Park property. 
CONCLUSION 
At the end of the analysis, this Court is left with the same situation facing the trial 
court, and which the trial court chose to leave unresolved: a parcel of usable land in Kane 
County, readily accessible over an existing right-of-way already encumbering a 
neighboring property, but without legal access to the outside world, and therefore useless. 
For those reasons set out above, as well as those set out in Plaintiff/Appellant's 
opening brief, it is submitted that the Court should either reform the relevant instruments 
of conveyance to recognize Smiths' plain intent to grant easement access to the Trust 
Property over the Park property, or recognize an easement by necessity permitting such 
access. 
DATED this 8th day of June, 2011. 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH PC 
By 
Vincent 'C. Rampton 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
980110.1 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF was mailed via first class mail, postage prepaid, to the 
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Michael W. Park 
The Park Firm PC 
315 West Hilton Drive, #4 
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